By George Franklin

Britain's Anti-Submarine potential, 1919-1939 is the 1st unified learn of the advance of Britain's anti-submarine potential among the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second one international German submarine assault on Britain's maritime exchange in 1939. good researched and but accessibly written, this e-book demanding situations the frequent trust that the Royal army did not expect the specter of the U-boat within the moment international battle.

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Extra resources for Britain's Anti-submarine Capability 1919-1939 (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History)

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PRO CAB 2/7, 326th meeting of the CID, 2 June 1938. PRO CAB 4/26, CID 1318-B, Defence Against Submarine Attack, March 1937, p. 1. , p. 3. 26 Copyright © 2003 George Franklin STRATEGY 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 PRO CAB 16/112, DRC paper 33, Naval Defence Requirements, submitted by CNS in Oct. 1935. PRO CAB 4/26, CID 1368-B, Protection of Seaborne Trade, pp. 2, 16. See Robert Mallett, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940, Frank Cass, London, 1998, pp. 18–21, for a modern analysis of Mussolini’s motives at Stresa.

1934, p. 4. Mallett, Italian Navy. Ismay, The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, Lon, London, 1960. Eden, Dictators, p. 268. For example, see The Cunningham Papers, Vol. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1, The Gathering Storm, Cassell, London, 1948. 27 Copyright © 2003 George Franklin 2 Organisation THE NAVAL STAFF In order to have any understanding of the process which led to major decisions about capability development, we need to have a sound understanding of the structure of the Naval Staff.

11 It has already been given that the anti-submarine expertise of the Naval Staff was limited to a core of officers who would frequently return to the same area, concerned primarily with procurement and tactical development, and that there were few if any in the Operations and Planning Divisions who had understanding of or experience in anti-submarine matters. From this comes the natural conclusion that those who conducted the strategic planning did so without the benefit of an appreciation of asdic’s capabilities and limitations.

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